The Iron Law
Max Weber examines the relationship
between democracy and bureaucratic organizations and discovers a paradoxical
relationship between the two institutions.
Some legal requirements further democracy as well as bureaucracy, such
as, the principle of "equal justice under the law." This would also include technical and
scientific knowledge rather than arbitrary decisions.[1] Nevertheless, according to Weber,
"'democracy' as such is opposed to the 'rule' of bureaucracy, in spite and
perhaps because of its unavoidable yet unintended promotion of
bureaucratization."[2] A major reason for this is that bureaucracy
concentrates power in the hands of those in charge of the bureaucratic
apparatus and thereby undermines democracy.[3] Robert Michels, in Political Parties, also argues from another perspective, that a
number of complex tendencies in organizations oppose the realization of
democracy. He postulates that democracy
leads to oligarchy and consequently the elite domination of policy outcomes.[4] Michels goes on to state, "It follows
that the explanation of the oligarchical phenomenon which thus results . . .
from the consolidation of every disciplined political aggregate … reduced to
its most concise expression, the fundamental sociological law of political
parties (the term 'political' being here used in its most comprehensive
significance) may be formulated in the following terms: 'It is organization which gives birth to the
dominion of the elected over the electors … of the delegates over the
delegators. Who says organization says
oligarchy."[5]
Michels' thesis in the "iron
law of oligarchy," challenges Rousseau's concept of direct popular rule
and both Madison and Jefferson’s representative form of democracy. The dysfunctional nature of existing democracy
for Michels, is not simply the result of social and economic underdevelopment
and alienation, inadequate education, media control of propaganda
advertisements, or the capitalist control of government organizations and
institutions. Rather, the problem of
democracy is rooted in its organic nature, and according to Michels' logic, any
organization must confront its tendency to be controlled at the top. He states, "The formation of oligarchies
within the various forms of democracy is the outcome of organic necessity, and
consequently affects every organization.[6] This phenomenon for Michels is an intrinsic
dimension of bureaucracy and any large-scale organization or institution. As a result, "Every party organization
represents an oligarchical power grounded upon a democratic basis. We find everywhere electors and elected. Also we find everywhere that the power of the
elected leaders over the electing masses is almost unlimited. The oligarchical structure of the building
suffocates the basic democratic principle."[7] Thus large-scale social organizations and
democracy are incompatible, which is position similar to Lowi's notion that
elitist interest-group liberalism undermines democracy[8]
and Olson's theory that large groups fail to identify and act on their
self-interest, reinforce Michels' position that the elite emerge from
democratic dysfunction to dominate organizations. Michels found that even socialist
organizations and trade unions that valued democracy could not pursue their
goals, even with strong leadership. From
this Michels proposed a general law that "the majority of human beings . .
. are predestined by tragic necessity, to submit to the dominion of a small
minority, and must be content to constitute the pedestal of an oligarchy."[9]
The underlying notion of a liberal
democracy is that government organizations and institutions are to be
administered in a democratic fashion by majority rule, respect for minority
rights, freedom of speech and dissent, based on a constitutional framework. On the other hand, while democratic values
and policies are to be implemented, the task must be implemented through the
most efficient and effective administrative methods available. Therefore agencies, governed primarily by the
principle of efficiency and effectiveness, tend to act in an autocratic
fashion. Nevertheless, if Michels'
argument is a sound one, then the implications for government are
startling: organizations and their subsequent policies are held captive by an
elite clientele. The reality of an
elite ruling government agencies, and for that matter, political parties,
unions, religious organizations, etc., conveys the idea that popular rule is
subverted. This leaves little doubt
organizations and institutions by their very nature are predisposed inherently to being co-opted by an elite faction. Thus
organizations and institutions are designed to serve the interests of an elite
cadre and not its rank and file members.[10]
In
summary, the "iron law of oligarchy," with respect to democratic
organizations and policy outcomes, functions in four different capacities. Organizations and policy outcomes: (1) mobilize the forces of indoctrination and
formal socialization in the direction of established interests and dominant
values; (2) control the means of rewards
and punishments based on organizational structures and behavior; (3) preempt competing behavioral forms and
thus structure the definition of "reality" to the advantage of the
elite; and, (4) reinforce their own
existence by preventing any question or ideological challenge to its purpose
and mission. Thus, Michels believed that
any organization or political system, democratic or egalitarian, becomes
oligarchic and therefore undemocratic.
If
this analysis which argues that the tendency of organizations (democratic
governments, political parties, unions, etc.) is to become oligarchic and
therefore obfuscate and undermine democratic rule, then it would seem plausible
that the very legitimacy of “democratic” government is in question, since
oligarchic rule appears not to serve the general will of the people and the
purposes of self-governance, but rather an elite cadre within organizations in
which individuals position themselves for control of the organizations. Liberal
democratic self-governance is in question, specifically as it relates to
contemporary liberal theorists such as John Rawls in A Theory of Justice, and Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia.
Both liberal theories - Rawls’ in prioritizing legal rights for those
least advantaged in society (welfare rights), and Nozick’s in prioritizing
maximum individual liberty (libertarianism) – are challenged by oligarchic
tendencies, that is, if Michels position is correct. This oligarchic tendency is also present in
radical and Marxist democratic organizations who argue for democratic rights as
the foundation of economic social justice in a democratic society. This tradition is espoused by Reinhold
Niebuhr, Edward Banfield, Amartya Sen and Rodney Peffer.[11]
The problem
associated with the inherent nature of democratic organizations to emerge as
non-democratic oligarchies, is exactly what anarchism seeks to confront. Anarchist critiques of the oligarchic and
authoritarian tendencies of Enlightenment liberalism and capitalist development
according to its chief spokespersons, such as, Gerrard Winstanley, William
Godwin, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Henry David Thoreau, Benjamin Tucker, and Emma
Goldman[12]
and contemporary critiques of modern liberalism, liberal democracies and
neoliberal capitalism by philosophical anarchists such as Charles Frankel, Noam
Chomsky, Michael Albert, Murray Bookchin, Robert Paul Wolff and A. John
Simmons, demand serious attention.[13] Here the understanding is that government,
law, and public policy, is hardly justification for moral guidance in the lives
of people. In fact, government coercion
for anarchists is the very basis of tyranny according to anarchists because it
violates the very nature of autonomous and free individuals and
communities. Nonviolent civil
disobedience, therefore, becomes the modus operandi of anarchists and
government dissenters in this tradition.
Early seventeenth
century British anarchist, Gerrard Winstanley, argued that the capitalist
accumulation of wealth and property resulted in greater social inequality and
that land should be understood as a “common treasury” and that the promotion of
federalism within nations and internationalism promoted throughout the world
represented the earliest developments in anarchist theory.[14] Winstanley argued that peasants possessed the
fundamental human right to the wealth they create and the land upon which they
worked. Known as the “Diggers,”
Winstanley urged peasants to “squat” on stretches of unused common land in
Southern England in order to provide themselves with both a domicile a
living. Moreover, for Winstanley the
individual person is marginalized by both monarchical and parliamentary
(democratic) rule. For anarchists, both
authoritarian and democratic rule resulted in plutocratic elite
domination. Much like today’s
libertarian movement, anarchists believed that the individual person should be
given the utmost possible freedom and that voluntary institutions best
represent the human person’s natural social tendencies. Yet, the voluntary association of unionized
workers, pitted against the elite control and possession of capital, clearly
differentiates anarchists from libertarians.
Marxists, on the other hand, differ from anarchists for the most part
precisely over the role of the state, since the state has a role to play in the
revolutionary class struggle. Anarchists
would not deny that class warfare results from capitalist exploitation, however
they tend to view any role of the state in resolving this conflict as lacking
any political legitimacy.
Later eighteenth
century British anarchists, such as William Godwin, argued that violent
revolutionary action was a legitimate course of action in the event that the
new “capitalist state” became increasingly tyrannical, especially in light of
the gross inequities of the burgeoning industrial revolution.[15] Godwin argued for a “fixed and immutable”
universal natural law as fundamental to justice. Here, Godwin argued that justice itself was
based on fundamental human rights, but that human laws could potentially be
fallible and that reason and conscience dictates obedience or disobedience to
human law. Godwin, furthermore, rejected
all established institutions and all social relations that suggested inequality
or the power of one person over another, including marriage. Influenced by the anarchist tendencies in the
social and political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, William Godwin argued
that while government might be considered necessary for the short term, in the
long run it would eventually become obsolete when others their very freedom and
autonomy would be secured through the non-interference in others’ lives.[16] Godwin further argued that individuals should
act in accordance with their own judgments and that in return others should be
allowed the same liberty.
Nineteenth-century
European anarchism developed independently from the earlier British
version. It grew out of French socialist
thought and German Neo-Hegelianism, as fused by Pierre Proudhon who in turn
profoundly influenced Marx and his development of anarchist thought, and later
theorists such as Michael Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, and Georges Sorel. This form of anarchism sought to eliminate
the role of the state and simultaneously uphold the greatest amount of freedom
based on three main areas: (1) the use of violence as a means to overthrow
authoritarian rule; (2) the establishment and respect for individual liberty
and human rights; and (3) the promotion of economic and social institutions
that foster individual freedom and the common good. With the exception of anarchists such as
Pierre Proudhon, Henry David Thureau, Leo Tolstoy, Robert Tucker, and Mohandas
Ghandi, who rejected violence as a form of revolutionary action, most
anarchists in the nineteenth century have sought to abolish injustice and establish
a socially just society based on the above three categories.[17] Thoreau, Tolstoy, Tucker, and Ghandi urged
peaceful nonviolent civil disobedience as an alternative to violent
revolutionary action.
Philosophical
anarchists argue, within the same basic anarchist tradition (e.g., mutualism,
anarcho-syndicalism, collectivism, individualism, pacifism, Wobblies, trade
unionism, Marxist Anarchism, left libertarianism) that authoritarian systems
are not the only form of state oppression but that the modern democratic state
itself has become, fundamentally, an instrument by which elites and special
interests in a liberal democracy coerce and even use their power to oppress
others.[18] Therefore the state, by virtue of its liberal
nature: (1) lacks legitimacy because the state serves elite interests at the
expense of individual and collective self-governance; and (2) impedes
individual autonomy and self-determination by compelling individuals to obey
the state through coercion (rules, regulations, and laws), and even force
(police and military action).
Philosophical anarchists thus argue that individuals, according to their
conscience, have the moral right not to comply with the state and even the
moral obligation to disobey the state in the event that the policies and laws
of a particular government violate the conscience of individual citizens. Godwin argued for a radical egalitarian
society where each person should take part in the production of necessities and
should share their part in the production of necessities with all in need. Here conceived, a society of free land
workers and artisans was the first outline of an anarchist society. This the “socialist” roots of anarchism trump
those of any libertarian element.[19]
In the past other
more militant schools of anarchist thought, including those of nineteenth
century figures such as Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Marx, argued that it was
necessary for the exploited working class to overthrow the state and its
controlling capitalist class, violently if necessary.[20] Philosophical anarchists argue that, rather
than taking up arms to bring down the state, the optimal situation is to work
for gradual change to free individuals from what they perceive to be oppressive
laws and social constraints of the modern state and allow all individuals to
become self-determining autonomous actors in the world. While philosophical anarchists oppose the
immediate elimination of the state by violent means, they adhere to this
primarily out of concern that what might remain in place after a given
revolution could very well become the establishment of a more harmful and
oppressive state. This is especially
true among those anarchists who consider violence and the state as synonymous,
or who consider it counterproductive and where public reaction to violence
could result in increased “law enforcement” or the reinforcement of the “police
state.” Subsequently philosophical
anarchists reject, for the most part, the urge to violence as a means for
eliminating the “illegitimate” state, while at the same time they accept the
existence of a minimal state as an unfortunate, but “necessary evil.” A. John Simmons states, “philosophical
anarchists hold that there are good reasons not to oppose or disrupt at least
some kinds of illegitimate states, reasons that outweigh any right or
obligation of opposition. The practical
stance with respect to the state, the philosophical anarchist maintains, should
be one of careful consideration and thoughtful weighing of all the reasons that
bear on action in a particular set of circumstances.”[21] And Robert Paul Wolff further states that
while philosophical anarchists may not wish to disrupt a particular state, they
do not necessarily think anyone has an obligation to obey the state. There can be no such thing as a government
that “has a right to command and whose subjects have a binding obligation to
obey.”[22]
Postmodern Anarchism
Other
forms of anarchism, such as postmodern anarchism, have been developed by
theorists such as May, Newman, and Call,[23]
who assert that the anarchist writings of Nietzsche, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Freud,
Durkheim, Levi-Strauss, Foucault, Baudrillard, and Chomsky, intersect with
postmodern critiques of modernism, rationalism, and scientism. Specifically, this theoretical construct,
where anarchism and postmodernism meet, moves beyond anarchism’s conventional
attacks on capital and the state to criticize those forms of rationality,
consciousness, and language that implicitly condition all economic and
political power. May, Newman, and Call,
argue that postmodernism contemporizes anarchism, making it relevant to the
current political culture of the twenty-first century.
The
postmodern anarchists draw on the works of several theorists in an attempt to
connect anarchism with postmodernism.
May, Newman, and Call, use anarchism to critique liberal notions of
language, consciousness, and rationality, which are inherent within capitalist
state organizations, and use postmodern methods to deconstruct hegemonies of
all sorts, predominantly those dominant ideas and beliefs at the heart of
capitalist and Marxist ideology. Yet,
their sharpest postmodern attack is leveled against bourgeois liberalism and
its manifestation in “late capitalism,” or as Veblen describes it, “conspicuous
consumption.” Here the postmodern
anarchists nevertheless, identify classical anarchism as being fundamentally opposed
to hierarchical (paternalistic) social relations inherent in capitalist modes
of production and state socialist regimes.
It therefore rejects state capitalist of state socialist uses of force
and the “coercive politics implicit in all state systems. Such anarchism envisions strictly voluntary
(and typically small-scale) forms of organization,”[24]
devoid of any reliance on modernism’s devotion to rationality as an organizing
principle typified by Western culture.
In this sense, postmodern anarchists argue that liberal democracies can
become, and often do become, oppressive hegemonies controlled by a power-elite
precisely “to prevent radical change.”
Postmodern anarchists such as Call, argue that although “liberalism
represents an impressive and historically important body of work … [it] imposes
a disturbing silence upon radical thinking.”[25] In rejecting Rorty’s liberal principles (and
those of other great liberals such as Holms, Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin, etc.), of
avoiding harm and cruelty to others, liberalism as applied to a democratic
society “functions to defend existing institutions and to prevent radical
change.”[26]
Resisting the rise of tyrants depends on safeguarding against the structural inequalities characteristic of oligarchies.
Anarchy as Social Justice
As a justifiable reaction to the problem of oligarchy in organizations and liberal democratic institutions, some theorists and activists have identified alternative political arrangements to liberal democratic organizations and institutions. Such anarchist examples include Chomsky’s recommendations of the Kibbutzim villages of Israel and the worker-owned cooperatives of Spain’s Mondragon experiments.[27] Other anarchist examples are based on the New Social Movements (NSM) school, which for the most part, have become an activist alternative means of self-governance through autonomous grass roots organizations.[28] Leading NSM theorists include, Alain Touraine, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Claus Offe, Immanueal Wallerstein, Michel Foucalut, and Jurgen Habermas. These proponents base their anarchist tendencies on identity, politics, culture, and ideology, which for all intents and purposes has emerged in the women’s movement, ecological and environmental movements, LGBT rights, peace movement, etc.
Currently, anarchist
NSM organizations have surfaced in the current culture through what can be
described as the “community of meaning” and “popular justice.” The goal of these alternative methods of
self-governance is to bypass the rigid oligarchy of the state, and for that
matter, even nonprofit organizations that tend toward oligarchic
structures. As such, the community of
meaning concept is based to a large degree on the anarchist-environmentalist-feminist
notion that human relationships in society are primarily based upon a
“conscience collective,” that is, the fostering of diverse talents and skills
within a local setting (community, neighborhood, school, etc.).[29] The strategy enables persons to respond to
various needs and cultivate unique talents while striving to maintain
sustainable development strategies and promote “socio-economic justice.” The community of meaning can also be
understood within the context of Marxist anarchist tendencies in which the
state would eventually give way to self-governing communities with the
intention of fostering both individual and collective solidarity “determined
precisely by the connection of individuals, a connection which consists partly
in the economic prerequisites and partly in the necessary solidarity of the
development of all … on the basis of existing productive forces.”[30] Likewise, individuals within a particular
community are united, according to Durkheim, not so much by what they have in
common, but rather, by their very differences, interdependence, and “organic
solidarity.”[31] The community of meaning, as Hampson and
Reddy assert, becomes and indispensable condition for cooperation within
society and is subsequently grounded upon ensuring a sustainable planet based
on the fundamental human needs of local communities as the policy priority.[32] This approach necessarily commits local and
global communities, as Mittleman argues, to sustainable development strategies
based upon mutually interrelated human concerns.[33] Thus, if sustainability is to have priority
in local policy initiatives at both the local and global community levels, and
if public or nonprofit organizations are unable to meet this criteria, then
anarchist communities of meaning must bypass these institutions and promote
local and global strategies favorable to environmental and socio-economic
justice based on sustainable development goals.[34] The guidelines for a community of meaning,
act as a strategy in which concerned people seek to address the causes of
poverty and simultaneously prevent, and even reverse, environmental
degradation. Moreover, the community of
meaning, whether informal or formal in nature, seeks to seeks to implement
where possible, policies based on what is known as “popular justice.”[35] In fact, Engle Merry and Milner argue that
the anarchist combination of the community of meaning and popular justice
strategies “is part of a protest against the state and its legal system by
subordinate, disadvantaged, or marginalized groups.”[36]
The notion of
popular justice for Engle Merry, “is a process for making decisions and
compelling compliance to a set of rules that is relatively informal in ritual
and decorum, nonprofessional in language and personnel, local in scope, and
limited in jurisdiction.”[37] Theoretically, popular justice governs the
community of meaning and simultaneously attempts to apply local standards and
rules, that is commonsense forms of reasoning to human relationships rather
than state laws.[38] Forums of popular justice, in its original
conception, are specifically intended to resolve disputes that involve small
sums of money, aspects of family life, and interpersonal injury short of
murder. Nevertheless, popular justice
forums can act, in similar capacity, as a model by which environmental and
socioeconomic justice concerns can be addressed as a form of binding
arbitration. According to Engel Merry
and Milner, these forums thus create a venue for the less powerful members of
society, such as, “the urban poor, rural peasants, the working class,
minorities, women,”[39]
to voice their concerns. In contrast,
elites utilize formal legal institutions through the state, since those same
elites have co-opted those very institutions and can thus control those
institutions for their own ends.
In the past, popular
justice has manifested itself in numerous venues. One form of popular justice can be identified
as “reformist.” In the reformist
tradition popular justice intends to develop adequate procedures for the varied
complexities the legal system facilitates; its goal is to make the system work
more efficiently, not to change its fundamental principles. This is intended to increase popular
participation in the functions of a centralized judicial system. Reformist approaches to popular justice
usually appear in countries based on the principles of liberal democracy and
capitalist economies. Failures in the
judicial system are generally attributed to the burdens on the legal system
rather than to the underlying structures of capitalism and its relationship to
law and the state. On the other hand,
the socialist tradition of popular justice is derived from Marxist-Leninist
theories about the role of popular justice “tribunals” to empower the masses to
address violations of laws and rules.
The role of the tribunals is to also educate the masses in the creation
of the Marxist “new man” of the revolutionary socialist order. According to Engle Merry, the masses are
included when “socialist popular justice promises to transform relations of
power from the domination of the bourgeoisie to that of the proletariat.”[40] Yet popular justice in this tradition tends
to reinforce existing structures of power in the same manner as that of the
reformist. Both socialist and reformist
approaches promote a form of institutional justice closely connected to, and
controlled, by the state.
Another model of
popular justice, based on violent uprisings in the anarchic tradition, is one
that is associated with mass revolt against the state and the existing social
order. While anarchic uprisings can be
nonviolent, they nevertheless tend to be violent and derived from popular
unrest do to perceived social injustices.[41] As a result of anarchic uprisings, the masses
generally intend to terminate their oppression and punish or reeducate their
enemies. In this case the masses do not
rely on an abstract idea of justice, but on their own experience and extent of
the injuries they have suffered.
However, this type of popular justice in its violent form is usually
“quelled by the state or brought under control of local communities.”[42]
The anarchic-environmentalist-feminist notion of popular justice associated with the community of meaning, tends to be more closely connected to, and controlled by indigenous people and grassroots movements.[43] While this version of popular justice does not necessarily rule out its use by elites, it nevertheless attempts to function outside the state and institutional mechanisms. A withdrawal from society, which is arguably too rigid, hierarchical and bureaucratic to serve the needs of a popular majority, is one of the goals of popular justice. The central understanding of this form of justice, according to Rifkin, is “decentralization … replacing centralized bureaucracy with small, local forums on a more humane scale.”[44] In this sense community norms govern people in a more humanistic and democratic manner while simultaneously maintaining local autonomy.
Conclusion
As Weber observes,
"How are freedom and democracy in the long run at all possible under the
domination of highly developed capitalism?"[45] Some
would argue that the vast disparity of economic power and wealth that is
increasing in the United States, translates into greater inequality for the
poor and marginalized. The question
remains pertinent today. As this crisis
deepens (the contradiction between the egalitarian expectations of democracy
and the rational utility of capital) the state and its citizenry have the
historical choice to address this conflict.
Here, Marcuse urges the human community to initiate "the radical
reconstruction of society . . . to find there the images and tones which may
break through the established universe of discourse and preserve the
future."[46] If organizations and their policy outcomes
are to have greater meaning and democratic accountability for the twenty-first
century, and if in fact it is worthwhile to understand how organizations tend
to serve elites within these very organizations, and not the rank and file
members that comprise it, then the primary goal of a democratic society would
be to strengthen their democratic institutions and restructure the allocation
of power away from elite control. As
such, anarchist principles of social justice point the way for this
restructuring and renewal of democratic institutions. The strengthening of democratic institutions
must therefore come from outside these very institutions as a form of ongoing
anarchist critique, agitation, and even civil disobedience if needed. The continued challenge for committed
democrats is to be mindful that democratic institutions act on behalf of an
elite interest and, ipso facto, subvert democratic egalitarian self-determining
groups. Hence providing resistance to
the oligarchic nature of democratic institutions in the United States and other
democracies through anarchic justice, is vital to democracy and greater
democratic participation.[47] Anarchic resistance to democratic
institutions is in essence the life blood of democracy.
[1] From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology,
pp. 224-228.
[2] Ibid.,
p. 231.
[3] Ibid.,
pp. 233-235.
[4] Robert Michels, Political Parties, p. 6.
[5] Ibid.,
p. 365.
[6] Ibid.,
p. 365-366.
[7] Ibid.,
p. 365.
[8] Theodore J. Lowi, The
End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, Second
Edition, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969, (1979). See Michael Parenti, Democracy for the Few, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1974.
[9] Ibid.,
p. 390.
[10]Mancur Olson, The
Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1965; E.E. Schattschneider, The
Semi-Sovereign People, New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960.
[11]Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral
Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics, New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1932; Edward Banfield, Politcal
Influence, New York: Free Press, 1961; Amartya Sen, Development As Freedom, London: Oxford University Press, 1999;
Amartya Sen, “Reason, Freedom and Well-Being,” Utilitas, 18(1), March 2006, 80-96; R.G. Peffer, Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990; R.G. Peffer, “Toward A More
Adequate Rawlsian Theory of Social Justice,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75, (1994), 251-271.
[12] Ibid.
[13] James Joll, The
Anarchists, London: Eyre and Spotliswoode, 1964; Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, New York:
Harper & Row, 1970; A. John Simmons, “The Anarchist Position,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 16,
Spring 1987, 269-279.
[14] Gerrard Winstanley, The New Law of Righteousness, [1649], Early English Books,
Electronic Reproduction, Arizona State University, Online Access.
[15] William Godwin, Enquiry
Concerning Political Justice, Kitchener, Ontario; Batoche, [1793] 2001.
[16] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “The Social Contract,” in Social Contract: Essay by Locke, Hume, and
Rousseau, New York: Oxford University Press, [1762] 1979.
[17] James Joll, The
Anarchists. Also see Pierre-Joseph
Proudhon, What Is Property? An Inquiry
into the Principle of Right and of Government, New York: Dover
Publications, [1840] 1970; Henry David Thureau, “Civil Disobedience,” Essays: A Fully Annotated Edition, New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, [1849] 2013; Robert Tucker, Why I Am An Anarchist, www.Philpapers.com, [1892], Retrieved 1-5-14.
[18] Robert Paul Wolff, In
Defense of Anarchism, New York: Harper & Row, 1976; A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979. Also see David Lyons, “Moral Judgment, Historical Reality,
and Civil Disobedience,” 27, Philosophy
& Public Affairs, 1998, 31-49; and Daniel McDermott, “The Duty to Punish and
Legitimate Government,” The Journal of
Political Philosophy, 7(2), 1999, 147-171.
[19] Bertrand Russell, Proposed
Roads to Freedom, New York, 1919; Alexander
Gray, The Socialist Tradition,
London, 1946; George Woodcock, Anarchism:
A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements, Cleveland, 1962.
[20] Mikhail Bakunin, Marxism,
Freedom and the State, London: Freedom Press, 1950; Anthony D’Agostino, Marxism and the Russian Anarchists, San
Francisco: Germinal Press, 1977; Paul Thomas, Karl Marx and the Anarchists, London: Routledge/Kegan Paul, 1985;
John H. Barker, Individualism and
Community: The State and Marx and Early Anarchism, New York: Greenwood
Press, 1986; Alan Carter, Marx: A Radical
Critique, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988; Sam Dolgoff (ed.), Bakunin on Anarchism, Montreal: Black
Rose Books, 2002.
[21] A. John Simmons, p.25-26, cited in Christopher H.
Wellman and A. John Simmons, Is There a
Duty to Obey the Law? New York: Cambridge University Press. Also see Susanne Sreedhar, “Anarchism,
Historical Illegitimacy, and Civil Disobedience: Reflections on A. John
Simmons’s Disobedience And Its Objects,”
Boston University Law Review 90,
1833-1846.
[22] Robert Paul Wolff, p. 141, cited in Rex Martin,
“Defense of Philosophical Anarchism,” Philosophical
Quarterly, 24(95), 140-149.
[23] Todd May, The
Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism, University Park:
Pennsylvania State University, 1994; Saul Newman, From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of
Power, Lantham: Lexington Books, 2001; Lewis Call, Postmodern Anarchism, New York: Lexington Books, 2002.
[24]Lewis Call, Postmodern
Anarchism, p. 14.
[25] Lewis Call, Postmodern
Anarchism, pp. 61-62.
[26] Lewis Call, Postmodern
Anarchism, p. 37.
[27] Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing
Consent.
[28] Alan Scott, Ideology
and New Social Movements, London: Routledge, 1990.
[29] Lisa Weinberg, “Understanding Social Process,” in Gary
Wamsley and James Wolff, eds., Refounding
Democratic Public Administration: Modern Paradoxes, Postmodern Challenges,
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996; Andrew Dobson, Green Political Thought, 3rd Edition, New York:
Routledge Press, 2000; Virginia Held, Feminist
Morality: Transforming Culture, Society, and Politics, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1993; Lois Ann Lorentzen, “Transformations Within third World
Grass Roots Environmental Movements,” in Sheldon Kamieniecki, (ed.), Environmental Politics in the International
Arena: Movements, Parties, Organizations, and Policy (New York: SUNY Press,
1993).
[30] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, New York: International Publishers, 1974, p.
118; Herbert
Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1972): 44-45; Kevin Phillips, The Politics of Rich and Poor:
Wealth and the American Electorate in the Reagan Aftermath (New
York: Random House, 1989).
[31] Emile Durkheim, The
Division of Labor in Society, New York: Free Press, 1933; Gerhard Lenski
and Jean Lenski, Human Societies: An
Introduction to Macrosociology, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982.
[32] Fen Osler Hampson and Judith Reppy, eds., Earthly Goods: Environmental Change and
Social Justice, Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
[33] James Mittleman, “Rethinking the International
Division of Labour in the Context of Globalization,” Third World Quarterly, Volume 16, Number 2, June 1995, pp. 273-295.
[34] Weinberg, Understanding
Social Process.
[35] Lois Ann Lorentzen, “Women, the Environment and
Sustainable Development: Cases from Central America,” in Brun Taylor, ed., Ecological Resistance Movements: The Global
Emergence of Radical and Popular Environmentalism, New York: SUNY Press,
1995; Lois Ann Lorentzen, “Empty Water
Pots: Women, the Environment and Sustainable Sufficiency,” Conference
Proceedings of the International Development Ethics Association Third
International Conference on Ethics and Development, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, June
21-27, 1992.
[36] Sally Engle Merry and Neal Milner, eds., The Possibility of Popular Justice: A Case
Study of Community Mediation in the United States, Ann Arbor, MI: The
University of Michigan Press, 1995, p. 31.
Also see Hiro N. Aragaki, “Deliberative Democracy as Dispute Resolution?
Conflict, Interests, and Reasons,” Ohio
State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 24(3), 2009, 406-478.
[37] Sally Engle Merry and Neal Milner, p. 32.
[38] Gary C. Bryner, Gaia’s
Wager: Environmental Movements and the Challenge of Sustainability, Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000; Charles Taylor, The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989): 497; From
Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, p.
236. Also see Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1974). Robert Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1985).
[39] Engle Merry and Milner, p. 33.
[40] Engle Merry and Milner, p. 42; John R.E. Bliese, "The
Conservative Case for the Environment," The Intercollegiate Review, Volume 32, Number 1, Fall 1996.
[41] Ted R. Gurr, Why
Men Rebel, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971.
[42] Merry and Milner, p. 49.
[43] Alan Durning, Guardians
of the Land: Indigenous Peoples and the Health of the Earth, Washington,
DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1992; Alan
Durning, Action at the Grassroots:
Fighting Poverty and Environmental Decline, Washington, DC: Worldwide
Institute, 1989; Lester Brown and Edward
C. Wolf, “The Illusion of Progress,” in L.R. Brown, ed., State of the World 1990, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988;
Jeremy Rifkin, Entropy: A New World View,
New York: Bantam Books, 1980.
[44] Rifkin, p. 46.
For examples of anarchic popular justice see Jonathan Rosenbloom, “New
Day at the Pool: State Preemption, Common Pool Resources, and Non-Place Based
Municipal Collaborations,” Harvard
Environmental Law Review, 36(2), 2012, 446-485; Oluf Langhelle,
“Sustainable Development and Social Justice: Expanding the Rawlsian Framework
of Global Justice, Environmental Values,
9(3), August 2000, 295-323.
[45] Max Weber, "Class,
Status, Party," in From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds., H.
Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1946), 236.
Also see Samuel Bowles and Herbert
Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism,
Second Edition, New York: Basic Books, 1987.
[46] Herbert Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, p. 93.
[47] Jeffrey A. Winters, “Oligarchy and Democracy,” The American Interest, 7(2),
November/December 2011; Thomas R. Dye, Harmon Ziegler, and Louis Schubert, The Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics,
Fifteenth Edition, Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2012; Noam Chomsky, Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and the
Global Order, New York: Seven Stories Press, 1999.
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